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Jurisdictional Statement
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4- l 03(2)(e ).

Introduction
In 2010, Mr. Nielsen pied guilty to theft and was ordered to pay restitution. Mr.
Nielsen has complied with that order and to date, has paid over $106,000 in restitution.
Under Utah law, a trial court has a nondiscretionary duty to make two restitution
determinations: (I) complete restitution; and (2) court-ordered restitution. Complete
restitution' means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by
the defendant. Court-ordered restitution' means the restitution the court orders the
®

defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence. In determining "complete restitution,"
the trial court is required to review several statutory restitution factors and support its
determination with findings of fact. While "complete restitution" cannot be adjusted in
any way, "court-ordered" restitution can be adjusted into an installment payment plan to
take the defendant's ability to pay into account.
In this case, the trial court did not review the statutory restitution factors, did not
make findings of fact to support the restitution order, and even ordered Mr. Nielsen to
pay restitution in installments by paying 25% of his income towards restitution. Thus, the

@

trial court clearly entered "court-ordered" restitution and never determined "complete
restitution." This distinction is important because only orders of "complete restitution"
may be entered on the civil judgment docket. When the trial court ordered "court-

@)

ordered" restitution in 2010, Mr. Nielsen rightfully believed and expected that the
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restitution amount would never, and could never, be converted into a civil judgment.
Indeed, because the trial court never reviewed the restitution factors, never made findings

®

of fact, and never determined complete restitution, he had no reason or cause to object to
the hypothetical entry of a civil judgment.
However, more than five years later the State requested that the trial court enter ~
civil judgment in the amount of the unpaid restitution. Mr. Nielsen objected, arguing that
a civil judgment could not be entered because the trial court never entered an order of
"complete restitution" in 20 I 0. The trial court acknowledged that it never determined
complete restitution, but nevertheless ordered that a civil judgment could be entered
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) on the grounds that the trial court's failure to
determine complete restitution was a "clerical" error. Because the trial court lost
jurisdiction to enter an order of complete restitution a year after sentencing occurred
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(d)(i)), the only way for the trial court to enter a civil
judgment was to find that a Rule 30(b) "clerical error" had occurred.
First, because only orders of complete restitution can be entered on the civil
judgment docket, the trial court erred by entering a civil judgment because it never
previously determined complete restitution. Second, the trial court also erred because the
failure to determine complete restitution is not a clerical error capable of being corrected
under Rule 30(b). Rather, it was a judicial error and the Utah Supreme Court has
confirmed that the determination of restitution requires "judicial reasoning and decision
making." Thus, as a matter of law, the trial court was not permitted to correct its failure
to determine complete restitution.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an order to pay restitution is legally
different from a trial court's determination of complete restitution. Mr. Nielsen is not
appealing his obligation to pay restitution in installments as ordered by the trial court. He
is appealing the trial court's decision that it made a clerical error when it failed to
determine complete restitution and its decision to thereafter enter the court-ordered
restitution amount as a civil judgment. Entering a civil judgment more than five years
after sentencing is not only contrary to law, it is also unjust because Mr. Nielsen
rightfully believed that the court-ordered restitution amount would never be converted
into a civil judgment. The trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution in
installments and allowing a civil judgment to be entered and enforced all at once will
circumvent that restitution order.
For these reasons, Mr. Nielsen requests that this court reverse the trial court's
@

decision to enter a civil judgment.
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Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in entering a civil judgment pursuant to Utah
R. Crim. P. 30(b) when the failure to determine complete restitution is not a correctable
clerical error and when it made findings of fact not supported by the record.
Standard of Review: "[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of
law that we review for correctness." State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62,111,218 P.3d 610,
613.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.289; Addn. A at 14-15.)
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in entering a civil judgment when it did not
determine complete restitution.
Standard of Review: "[I]n the case of restitution, a reviewing court will not
disturb a district court,s determination unless the court exceeds the authority prescribed
by law or abuses its discretion." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,110,214 P.3d 104, 108.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.163-170)

Determinative Provisions
The following provisions are set forth in Addendum D:
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-401.

{01027451-1}
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·Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
At the time of sentencing in 2010, the trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay court-

ordered restitution. However, it is undisputed that the trial court did not review the
required restitution factors, did not make corresp~nding findings of fact, and never
determined "complete restitution." Over five years later, the State attempted to have the
court-ordered restitution amount converted into a civil judgment. The trial court found
that its failure to determine "complete restitution" in 2010 was a clerical error that could
be corrected under Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). Based on its finding that the failure to
determine complete restitution was a Rule 30(b) clerical error, the trial court entered a
judgment on the civil judgment docket for the unpaid restitution amount.

2.

Statement of Facts
Mr. Nielsen is Sentenced and Ordered to Pay Restitution in 2010
On March 22, 2010, Mr. Nielsen pied guilty to the charge of theft. (R.27-34.) On

July 26, 2010, the Court entered the Judgment and Commitment stating that Mr. Nielsen
had pied guilty to the referenced offense and entering a sentence for a period of one ( 1) to
fifteen (15) years. (R.59-60; Addn. B.) In addition, the Judgment and Commitment
stayed the sentence and placed Mr. Nielsen on probation for a period of six (6) years. (R.
60; Addn. B.) As part of probation, Mr. Nielsen was ordered to serve one year in the
county jail and ordered to pay restitution to the victim Creekside Investments, Inc.
("Creekside") in the amount of $346,248.58. (Id.) No findings of fact or any other
analysis accompany the trial court's decision to enter this restitution amount. There is no
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reference in the Judgment and Commitment that the trial court was making a finding of
"complete restitution."
On ~ovember 12, 20 I 0, following a review hearing, the trial court released Mr.
Nielsen from jail and modified the court-ordered restitution as follows:
That the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $346,248.58 to
Creekside Funding. . . . Defendant shall pay 25% of his gross income as
restitution up to an income of $120,000. If defendant's income is more
than $120,000, restitution shall be reassessed.
("Modified Restitution Order," R.125-126; Addn. C.) Again, no findings of fact or any
other analysis accompany the trial court's decision to enter the above restitution amount.
There is no reference in the Modified Restitution Order that the trial court was making a
finding of "complete restitution."
The State Requests the Trial Court Enter a Civil Judgment in 2015
More than five years after sentencing, the State requested that the trial court enter
a civil judgment in the amount of unpaid restitution and submitted a proposed civil
judgment. (R.157.) Mr. Nielsen filed an objection to the entry of the civil judgment
arguing that the trial court lacked authority to enter a civil judgment for the reasons set
forth herein (the "Objection"). (R.161-181.) Following oral argument on the Objection,
the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.289; Addn. A) and then
entered a civil judgment on the civil judgment docket (the "Civil Judgment"). (R.207208.)
The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions
In analyzing the arguments of the parties, the Court made several material findings
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and conclusions, which are numbered below.
First, the trial court acknowledged that the relevant statutes and case law were not
followed regarding the trial court's duty to determine complete restitution:

I. Well, I find this frustrating because the statute just wasn't followed ....
[State v.] Laycock seems to say that you have to [make a finding of
complete restitution] ... and it didn't happen in this case and, so, it's
messy to retroactively, five years later, go back and decide what to do.
(R.289; Addn. A at 34:23 - 35:5) (emphasis added).
2. So there is not an explicit finding in the judgment in this case as to
whether restitution--the restitution number was complete, court-ordered
or both.
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4.)
3. I just have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an abuse
of discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution and courtordered restitution, I have a hard time saying it was just a clerical error
for the Clerk to not record complete restitution as a judgment and
nothing was called that.
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4; 36:21 - 37:1.)
4. 77-38A-401 says upon the Court determining that a defendant owes
restitution, the Clerk of the Court shall enter an order of complete
restitution on the civil judgment docket. This didn't happen.
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:9-12) (emphasis added).
The trial court then acknowledged that "complete restitution" in this case would
@

@

have been more than the amount of restitution Mr. Nielsen was ordered to pay:
5. If anything, complete restitution would be more than this number. It
wouldn't inure to the detriment of the defendant. It's--the restitution that
was clearly court-ordered is the bottom amount that complete restitution
could be. It certainly has to be supported by the facts of what was owed
and complete restitution, if anything, would only be more.
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(R.289; Addn. A at 35:18-23) (emphasis added).
Regarding the State's argument that the trial court's failure to determine complete
restitution at the time of sentencing could be remedied as a "clerical error" under Utah R.
Crim. P. 30(b), the trial court stated:
6. So I really am not--I'm not certain of the right thing to do because to
correct it, as a clerical error, would be to say the Clerk should have done
this because it's clear there should have been a complete restitution
ordered, but nothing was called complete restitution and the statute and
the Supreme Court has clearly said we're supposed to call things
complete and court-ordered and that didn't happen. So it makes it
difficult to say it was just a clerical error.
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:9-16.)
7. I have a hard time saying it was just a clerical error for the Clerk to not
record complete restitution as a judgment and nothing was called that.
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:24 -37:1.)
The trial court ultimately held that because Mr. Nielsen did not object that the trial
court failed to make a finding of complete restitution that Mr. Nielsen therefore agreed
the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment was the "complete
restitution" amount:
8. Well, I wish there were a cleaner record on this. I will just make the
findings that I can from the information that I have and then rule the
best that I can based on the record in this case. So there is not an
explicit finding in the judgment in this case as to whether restitution-the restitution number was complete, court-ordered or both. However,
at the time and since then there was not a dispute as to the restitution
amount and it was agreed upon by the parties at the time of sentencing
and it hasn't been disputed. Amount has not ever been disputed. So this
was an agreed upon amount.
(R.289; Addn. A at 41 :23-8.)

{01027451-1}
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To support its decision to enter a civil judgment pursuant Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b),
the trial court made findings fact regarding the parties and the trial court's intentions and
the alleged agreement from 20 I 0:
9. In looking at Rule 30(b), it states that you can correct a clerical mistake
and when looking at what the factors are to determine if something is
clerical, one is whether the order or judgment rendered reflects what
was done or intended. I think that the restitution amount was clearly the
one that was agreed upon by the parties and that the Court intended to
order and that's what should have been.
(R.289; Addn. A at 43 :3-9) (emphasis added).
10. Second, whether the error was the result of judicial reasoning or
decision-making. I don't think this is. The Court should have called it
complete and court-ordered, but the fact that everyone agreed to this
number, I don't think there's a dispute about what the Court meant to do.
This wasn't a Court decision to not enter it as a civil judgment. It
should have happened and then, finally, whether the error is clear from
the record. I think it's clear that this restitution amount was entered and
it was n(?t entered as a civil judgment.
So under Rule 30(b), I'll say that this can be entered in the docket as a
civil judgment.
(R.289; Addn. A at 43:13-23) (emphasis added).
However, the trial court failed to cite any part of the record to support its finding
that Mr. Nielsen agreed that the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and
Commitment would be considered "complete restitution" or to support its finding that the
€i>

trial court intended to determine complete restitution in 20 I 0. (See generally, R.289;
Addn. A.)

{01027451-1}
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Summary of the Argument
In a criminal matter, the trial court has a "non-discretionary" d4ty to determine
"complete restitution" and the failure to do so is reversible error. In this case, the
Judgment and Commitment merely orders Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution, i.e., "court
ordered restitution." The trial court never made a determination of complete restitution
and in fact admits that it failed to make this required determination. Pursuant to Section
77-38a-40 I (I), only orders of "complete restitution" can be entered on the civil judgment
docket. ·Accordingly, the trial court erred when it entered the court-ordered restitution
amount as a civil judgment.
The trial court also erred by entering the civil judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim.
P. 30(b). The purpose of Rule 30(b) "is to correct clerical errors so that the record
reflects what was actually 'done or intended."' First, only clerical errors, rather than
judicial errors, can be corrected under Rule 30(b ). The Utah Supreme Court has
confirmed "that the district court's determination of restitution require[s] judicial
reasoning and decision making." Accordingly, the failure to determine complete
restitution was a judicial error which cannot be corrected through Rule 30(b).
Second, when analyzing an error under Rule 30(b), the trial court may "not
examine [the trial court's] intent where the written order is unequivocal." In this case, the
Judgment and Commitment is unambiguous as it makes no reference to "complete
restitution," the restitution factors listed in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5), or
reference any findings of fact which would support a determination of complete
restitution. The Judgment and Commitment simply requires Mr. Nielsen to pay

{01027451-1}
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restitution which is legally different from a court's determination of complete restitution.
Thus, the trial court erred when it reviewed extrinsic evidence of its intent when the
orders at issues are unambiguous.
Third, even if the failure to determine complete restitution was a correctable
clerical error, and even if the trial court was permitted to review extrinsic evidence of its
intent, there is still insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings
that: (1) it intended to determine complete restitution: or (2) that Mr. Nielsen agreed that
the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment would be considered
"complete restitution" and therefore capable of being entered as a civil judgment.
Because the record does not support the trial court's findings, this court must reverse.

{01027451-1}
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Argument

1.

The Trial Court Has a Non-Discretionary Duty to Determine Complete
Restitution and Only Orders of Complete Restitution can be Entered as Civil
Judgments.

In a criminal case, "restitution is mandated by statute and is a part of a criminal
sanction imposed by the state." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 18,214 P.3d 104, 109.
Trial courts are required ''to make two separate restitution determinations, one for
complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution." Id. at iJ 20. ~'Courtordered restitution may be identical in amount to complete restitution, but it need not be
so. The trial court has a non-discretionary duty to make a finding of complete restitution
together with findings of fact supporting the determination." See State v. Barrett, 2004
UT App 239, 2 (unpublished). "[A] court does not, however, have discretion to not make
restitution determinations with supporting findings. By express language, the Act
imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon a judge to make the appropriate determinations
regarding restitution, along with the rationale to explain the decision." Id. (emphasis
added); State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 23 (Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-401(1)
"commands ... that complete restitution be determined.").
The Utah Crime Victims Restitution Act, at Section 77-3 8a-40 I ( 1), provides:
Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in Section
77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to
the parties.

(Id.) (emphasis added); State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, n. 2 ("[§ 77-38a-401(1)]
provides that the amount of complete restitution 'shall be entered' on the civil docket and
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is enforceable as a civil judgment.") Thus, pursuant to Section 77-3 8a-40 I (1 ), only
orders of "complete restitution" can be entered on the civil judgment docket. In this case,
the trial court determined that it never entered an order of complete restitution.
2.

The Trial Court Erred When It Entered the Civil Judgment Pursuant to Utah
R. Crim. P. 30(b).
2.1

Rule 30(b) Purpose and Standards.

The purpose of Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "is to correct
clerical errors so that the record reflects what was actually 'done or intended.'" State v.

Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,r 14,218 P.3d 610,614 (quoting Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002
UT 36, ,r 30, 48 P.3d 218. Rule "30(b) is virtually identical to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a), and
~

the 'clerical error' analysis under both sections is often indistinguishable." Rodrigues,
2009 UT 62, n. 3; State v. Moya, 815 P .2d 1312, n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("review of an
order based on either rule results in the same conclusion.") Accordingly, decisions
analyzing clerical errors under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) and Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) will be
discussed below.
Because the trial court only has authority to correct "clerical" errors, it must
determine whether the error is judicial or clerical in nature:
[t]he distinction ... depends on whether [the error] was made in rendering
the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. A clerical error is
one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment
which does not conform to the actual intention of the court. On the other
hand, a judicial error is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a
substantively incorrect judgment.

Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, 114 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also State v.
Moya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("the substantive purpose of Rule 60(a)
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to curing errors in accurately
memorializing a judgment.") (emphasis in original). In sum, the "clerical error analysis

generally focuses on ( 1) whether the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what
was done or intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision
making, and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,r 14.
2.2

The Failure to Determine Complete Restitution was the Result of
Judicial Decision Making and Therefore Not Correctable Under Rule
30(b).

The failure to determine complete restitution is a judicial error, not a clerical error.
"The distinction ... depends on whether [the error] was made in rendering the judgment
or in recording the judgment as rendered." Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, 146,
253 P.3d 1096, 1108; see also Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d
1201 (Utah 1983) (a clerical error "is a type of mistake or omission mechanical in nature
which is apparent on the record and which does not involve a legal decision or
judgment.").
In this case, .the failure to determine complete restitution was not a mechanical
mistake and or a clerical omission. Rather, it was an error in rendering a legal decision.
The Utah Supreme Court has confirmed "that the district court's determination of
restitution reguire(s] judicial reasoning and decision making." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ~
25 (emphasis added) (finding that trial court made a clerical error by miscalculating the
amount of restitution). The determination of complete restitution is an act of judicial
decision making which requires the trial to review the restitution factors, determine
complete restitution, and then support its determination with findings of fact. See Utah
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Code Ann. § 77-38a-302; State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, 2. It is an act in rendering
a judicial decision, not an act in recording one.
In this case, the trial court entered the Civil Judgment pursuant to Rule 30(b)
because it ruled that the failure to determine complete restitution was a clerical error.
~

This was error because the trial court's failure to determine complete restitution was a
clear judicial error which cannot be corrected through Rule 30(b). For this reason alone,
the trial court's decision to enter a civil judgment must be reversed.

2.3

There is No Evidence in the Record Indicating That the Trial Court
Actually Intended to Make a Determination of Complete Restitution.

In order to enter the Civil Judgment under Utah R. Crim. P. 3 O(b ), the trial court
(i)

was required to determine whether it "actually intended" to determine complete
restitution. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,r 14; Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah
1984) ("The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be undertaken for the purpose
of reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties."). Even if the failure to
determine complete restitution is a "clerical" error, there is no evidence in the record that
the trial court intended to determine complete restitution.

2.3.1 Because the Judgment and Commitment and the Modified
Restitution Order Are Unambiguous it is Improper to Consider
the Trial Court's Intent.
Although the purpose of Rule 30(b) is to determine what the trial court actually
intended, the trial court is not permitted to explore what was intended unless the language
of the judgement is ambiguous. State ex rel. C.S.B., 2000 UT App 362, ,r 9, 17 P.3d 1131,
@

1133 ("[w]here the language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given
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effect as it is written.") (analyzing Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a), Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) and
citing State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91, 93 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
In State v. Denny, the issue was whether the duration of defendant's probation was
for a period of 18 months or 3 years. The probation order stated that the defendant "be
placed on probation for a period of three (3) years ...." Denney, 776 P.2d at 92.
However, the Utah Court of Appeals found that"[ a]fter reviewing the record, it appears
that the trial court may have intended to sentence defendant to two consecutive terms of
probation lasting eighteen months each" because the trial court stated on the record that
"[t]he eighteen months probation was imposed on each felony to run consecutively." Id.
at 92-93. But despite the strong evidence of the trial court's intention that probation last
only 18 months, the Utah Court of Appeals declined to alter the unambiguous probation
order. It reasoned that:
'Where the language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be
given effect as it is written .... ' (citing State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 466, 659
P.2d 918, 923 (App.1983). It is necessary that sentences be rendered with
clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the possibility of confusion and
injustice.
Broad and uniform recognition has been given to the precept that a sentence
imposed by a court acting in a criminal case should be definite, unequivocal
and unambiguous, so that both the defendant and the officials charged with
executing the sentence will be fairly apprised of the intentions of the court.
This principle was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363, 46 S.Ct. 156, 157, 70 L.Ed.
309 (1926), where the Court held that "[s]entences in criminal cases should
reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious
misapprehensions by those who must execute them.'' However, "'where the
meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and other documents of record may be
reviewed for purposes of construing the meaning of the judgment.' (quoting
Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923.)
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Id. at 93. The Denny Court then articulated the rule that "we do not examine [the trial
court's] intent where the written order is unequivocal." Id.
In this case, the Judgment and Commitment and the Modified Restitution Order
are unambiguous. Neither order makes any reference to "complete restitution," the
restitution factors listed in Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(5), or reference any findings of
fact which would support a determination of complete restitution. These orders simply
require Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution which is legally different from a court's

determination of complete restitution. See State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 23. Because
these orders make no reference to complete restitution, they are unequivocal and
unambiguous on this point. As a result, the trial court erred by looking to the record in an
attempt to ascertain whether it actually intended to determine complete restitution, and
then ultimately erred by entering the Civil Judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b).

2.3.2 There is No Evidence in the Record Indicating That the Trial
Court Actually Intended to Make a Determination of Complete
Restitution.
Even if it the Judgment and Commitment and the Modified Restitution Order were
somehow ambiguous there is still no evidence in the record indicating that the trial court
intended to determine complete restitution. First, the record does not support a finding
~

that the trial court intended to determine complete restitution because the trial court
admitted that "it didn't happen in this case" and that "the statute just wasn't followed":
Well, I find this frustrating because the statute just wasn't followed ....
[State v.] Laycock seems to say that you have to [make a finding of
complete restitution] ... and it didn't happen in this case and, so, it's messy
to retroactively, five years later, go back and decide what to do.

{0I02745l•l}
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(R.289; Addn. A at 34:23 - 35:5.)
So there is not an explicit finding in the judgment in this case as to whether
restitution--the restitution number was complete, court-ordered or both.
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4.)
I just have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an abuse of
discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution ....
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4; 36:21 - 37: 1.)
77-38A-401 says upon the Court determining that a defendant owes
restitution, the Clerk of the Court shall enter an order of complete
restitution on the civil judgment docket. This didn't happen.
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:9-12) (emphasis added).
Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find that the trial court intended to
determine complete restitution when no attempt was made to comply with Utah Code
Ann.§§ 77-38a-401 or 77-38a-302(5).
It is also very difficult to find that the trial court intended to determine complete
restitution when it found that the complete restitution amount would have been greater
@

than the $346,248 restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment:
If anything, complete restitution would be more than this number. . . . It
certainly has to be supported by the facts of what was owed and complete
restitution, if anything, would only be more.
(R.289; Addn. A at 35:18-23) (emphasis added).
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the trial court did not intend to determine
complete restitution is the trial court's own statements which demonstrate just how
unclear the record was regarding the trial court's intent in 2010:
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I don't think there is a clean answer here. I think it's deficient, but that it
wasn't objected to. So I really don't think there is a clean answer. I don't
find anything that satisfactory in either direction. Because it seems
enforceable, both sides agreed to it. It seems unfair to dispute it now, but
you know various things went wrong.
So I really am not--I'm not certain of the right thing to do because to correct
it, as a clerical error, would be to say the Clerk should have done this
because it's clear there should have been a complete restitution ordered, but
nothing was called complete restitution and the statute and the Supreme
Court has clearly said we're supposed to call things complete and courtordered and that didn't happen. So it makes it difficult to say it was just a
clerical error.

If anyone has any brilliant proposals here, I'm happy to hear it, but it just
seems like there are problems with it that make a clear answer difficult.
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:3-19.)
I just have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an abuse of
discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution, I have a hard time saying it was just a clerical error for the Clerk
to not record complete restitution as a judgment and nothing was called
that.
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:21-25 - 37:1.)
But despite the fact that the record did not support a finding that the trial court
intended to determine complete restitution, the trial court nevertheless entered the Civil
Judgment under Rule 30(b) because it believed that "the restitution amount was clearly
the one that was agreed upon by the parties":
In looking at Rule 30(b), it states that you can correct a clerical mistake and
when looking at what the factors are to determine if something is clerical,
one is whether the order or judgment rendered reflects what was done or
intended. I think that the restitution amount was clearly the one that was
agreed upon by the parties and that the Court intended to order and that's
what should have been.
@

(43:3-9)
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The Court should have called it complete and court-ordered, but the fact
that everyone agreed to this number, I don't think there's a dispute about
what the Court meant to do. This wasn't a Court decision to not enter it as
a civil judgment. It should have happened and then, finally, whether the
error is clear from the record. I think it's clear that this restitution amount
was entered and it was not entered as a civil judgment.
So under Rule 30(b), I'll say that this can be entered in the docket as a civil
judgment.
(43: 14-23) (emphasis added)
The trial court erred. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Nielsen
stipulated or agreed that the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment
would be considered "complete restitution" and therefore capable of being entered as a
civil judgment. The trial court failed to support its findings with any citation to the
record. The trial court was unable to adequately support its findings because it never
complied with Utah Code§§ Section 77-38a-401(1), 77-38a-302(5)(a)-(b), or State v.

Laycock, 2009 UT 53, by analyzing the restitution factors and making findings of fact
supporting its restitution determination. The only potential evidence the trial court raised
was the plea agreement 1 but that document does not list any restitution amount that could
have been agreed to by Mr. Nielsen. (R.27-34.) In sum, the trial court decided to enter
the Civil Judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) based on its finding that the parties
agreed to the restitution amount and that finding is incorrect. See State v. Rodrigues, 2009
UT 62,111,218 P.3d 610,613. {"The interpretation of [Rule 30(b)] is a question oflaw
that we review for correctness.")

1

"What about the plea agreement though that gives that number that everyone signed, the
statement of defendant?" (R 31 :20-22.)
{01027451-1}
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For these reasons, the trial court's application of Rule 30(b) is not supported by
the record, is legally incorrect, and therefore the trial court's decision to enter the Civil
Judgment must be reversed.

3.

The Trial Court Erred when it Entered the Civil Judgment Because it Never
Made a Finding of "Complete Restitution".
Utah Code Section 77-38a-401(1) "commands ... that complete restitution be

determined" and the trial court has a "nondiscretionary duty" "to make the appropriate
determinations regarding restitution, along with the rationale to explain the decision." See
State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, 2. In addition, pursuant to Section 77-38a-401(1),
only orders of "complete restitution" can be entered on the civil judgment docket.

In this case, there can be no dispute that the trial court did not determine
"complete restitution" and did not enter an "order of complete restitution." There can be
no dispute because the trial court actually found that Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-401(1)
''just wasn't followed" and that, with respect to whether it made a finding of complete
restitution in 2010, the trial court found that "it just didn't happen." (R.289; Addn. A at
34:23 - 35:5, 42:9-12.)
The record supports the trial court's finding that it failed to determine complete
restitution and failed to enter an order of complete restitution. First, there is no order
@

entered on the docket titled "Order of Complete Restitution" or any order or judgment
indicating that the Court made a finding of"complete restitution." Neither the Judgment
and Commitment nor the Modified Restitution Order make any reference to "complete
restitution."
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Second, under Section 77-38a-401(1), when the trial court makes a finding of
complete restitution, that order must be entered on the civil judgment docket. But the
fact that neither Judgment and Commitment nor the Modified Restitution Order was
entered on the civil judgment docket establishes that the trial court did not enter an order
of complete restitution. Indeed, if it had, then there would be a preexisting civil
judgment.
Third, as set forth above, trial courts are required "to make two separate restitution
determinations, one for complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution."

State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, 120. "Unlike complete restitution, court-ordered
restitution may be adjusted to take the defendant's ability to pay into account." Id. at 1
30. In this case, the Modified Restitution Order modified the terms of restitution set forth
in the Judgment and Commitment by setting the restitution payments to be equal to "25%
of his gross income ... up to an income of $120,000." (R.60; Addn. B.) The trial court
likely made this adjustment to account for Mr. Nielsen's inability to pay the entire
restitution amount all at once. But the simple fact that the Judgment and Commitment
@

was adjusted at all definitively establishes that there was no finding of "complete
restitution" because the trial court could not modify "complete restitution" orders as a
matter of law.
Fourth, "[a] court's 'determination' of restitution is different from ordering a
defendant to pay restitution." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,123. Here, is undisputed
that the trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution in 20 IO through the Judgment
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and Commitment. The fact that the trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution is
legally different from the trial court's obligation to determine restitution
Fifth, in determining complete restitution, "a district court looks to section 7738a-302(5) for the factors it must consider":
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and
devices relating to physical or niental health care, including nonmedical
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing
recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that
are lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade
that were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current
employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.

State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 20 (quoting§ 77-38a-302(5)(a)-(b).)
After the trial court considers and reviews these restitution factors, it is then
required to enter an order of "complete restitution" supported by findings of fact. It is
reversible error if the district court does not support an order of complete restitution "with
supporting findings ... along with the rationale to explain the decision." See State v.

Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, 2; State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 23.
In State v. Barrett, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[u]nder the plain
language of the (Utah Crime Victims Restitution] Act, a court does not, however, have
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discretion to not make restitution determinations with supporting findings. By express
language, the Act imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon a judge to make the appropriate
determinations regarding restitution, along with the rationale to explain the decision." Id.
The Barrett Court then held that the trial court erred when it failed to make a finding of
complete restitution and when it failed to "explain [its] rationale with findings on the
required factors made on the record." Id. at 2. Thus, the failure to determine complete
restitution and the failure to support that determination with findings of fact is reversible
error under Barrett.
7

In State v. Laycock, the trial court did not determine complete restitution because
of the "difficulty of ascertaining complete restitution based on incomplete facts and
speculation." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,, 23. In response the Utah Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he statute2 commands, however, that complete restitution be determined."

Id. The Court then held that:
A court's 'determination' of restitution is different from ordering a
defendant to pay restitution. After determining complete restitution, a
district court judge may then order court-ordered restitution as part of the
criminal sentence based on facts that would meet the same strict
requirements as found in a civil setting.
Here, Judge Laycock failed to make a determination of complete
restitution. This was error. She was clearly required to determine complete
restitution, as set out in Utah Code section 78-38a-302(2).
Id. at 1123-24 (emphasis added).

In this case, the trial court did not make any attempt to "determine" complete
restitution, review the restitution factors, or issue findings of fact supporting a
2

Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302.
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determination of complete restitution. In fact, the trial court admitted it did not perform
any of these non-discretionary acts. (R.289; Addn. A at 34:23 - 35:5, 42:9-12.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not make a finding of complete restitution. This is
reversible error under Laycock and Barrett. Because only orders of "complete
restitution" can be entered as civil judgments and because the trial court never
determined "complete restitution," the trial court's decision to enter the Civil Judgment
must be reversed.

Conclusion and Relief Requested
"It is necessary that sentences be rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to

avoid the possibility of confusion and injustice." State v. Denney, 776 P.2d at 93. The
Judgment and Commitment was rendered with clarity and accuracy demonstrating that
the trial unequivocally intended to enter "court-ordered" restitution and did not intend to
@

enter a civil judgment. From the time of sentencing and for over five years thereafter,
Mr. Nielsen believed in good faith that the trial court did not intend to determine
complete restitution and therefore would never enter a civil judgment. Indeed, because
the trial court never reviewed the restitution factors, never made findings of fact, and
never determined complete restitution, Mr. Nielsen had no reason or cause to object to
the hypothetical entry of a civil judgment. Mr. Nielsen relied on the trial court's clear
decision, but now he and his wife face the prospect of losing their marital home through
the complete enforcement of the newly entered Civil Judgment - a judgment that
circumvents and violates the trial court's "court-ordered" restitution order requiring Mr.
Nielsen to pay restitution in installments. This is an injustice that Denny and Utah Courts
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seek to avoid.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred when it when it entered the courtordered restitution amount as a civil judgment because it never previously made a
determination of complete restitution. The trial court erred by entering the Civil
Judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) because the failure to determine complete
restitution was a judicial error which cannot be corrected through Rule 30(b ).
This court should reverse the trial court's decision to enter the Civil Judgment.
Dated this 1st day of August 2016.
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS

Timothy R. Pack
Attorneys for Defendant Gary W. Nielsen
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The second argument they make is that there is a

2

clerical error that the Court can fix. It's a 30(b) argument. Mr.

3

Bates says the Clerk failed to fulfill her statutorily mandated

4

duty to enter the restitution amount on the civil judgment docket

5

and Mr. Bates cites to the Rodriguez case and I think that's tab

6

4 in the binder I gave you. I'm going to turn to it really quick.

7

It's paragraph 14.

8
9

So at paragraph 14 of the second sentence says in our
analysis. In our analysis under Rule 30(b), we draw a distinction

10

between clerical errors and judicial errors. A distinction

11

depends on whether the error was made in rendering the judgment

12

or in recording the judgment as rendered. A clerical error is one

13

made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a

14

judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the

15

Court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in

16

rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect

17

judgment.

18

So in Rodriguez, in that case the defendant agreed that

19

restitution was a certain amount and the actual restitution that

20

was entered reflected a different amount. It was a typo and we

21

know that under Laycock and Barrett failure to follow the

22

statutory requirements make those findings of fact. That's not a

23

clerical error. That's not a typo. That is in the judicial realm

24

of error.

25

That's not a clerical error and the Rodriguez court
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1

also looked at three factors in its 30(b) analysis, one of which

2

is whether the Court's order reflects what was intended. We don't

3

know what was intended. There is no findings of fact.

4

Mr. Bates wasn't counsel of record at that time. I

5

wasn't counsel of record at that time. So we don't know what was

6

intended. There's no evidence in the record to base that decision

7

on. This is not a clerical issue and the Clerk did not make a

8

mistake. There was no order of complete restitution to enter on

9

the civil judgment docket.

10

We think this is an issue of protecting substantive

11

rights and substantive procedure which was not followed in this

12

case and procedure when not followed is reversible error under

13

Laycock and Barrett.

14

I just want to make a couple final points here. We also

15

object to the interest calculation. We've pointed out that no

16

interest should be accruing on this court-ordered restitution

17

amount. Restitution was ordered as part of Mr. Nielsen's

18

probation. There's no mention of interest or that interest should

19

accrue. There's no civil judgment entered wherein post-judgment

20

interest could accrue and the State didn't oppose this argument

21

in their response to our objection. So I think this point is

22

conceded and, as of today, we calculate the principle amount

23

being owed as $265,089.00.

24

25

Last point, Your Honor. Excuse me. I talk too much. The
State also conceded that under Utah Code 77-38A-302.5 the Court
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1

obligation to order that that judgment be put on the civil

2

judgment docket so that she can do that because it should have

3

been done is years ago.

4

MR. PACK:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. PACK:

May I respond, Your Honor?
Uh-huh [affirmative].
And I have a draft of this proposed

7

stipulation if the Court wants to see what we're talking about.:

8

Again, Dr. Maw is not the victim. She does not have any rights

9

here. Mr. Bates does not have an obligation to stick up for her

10

and to pursue her rights. She is a third-party commercial

11

creditor.

12

MR. BATES:

Judge, should we get Dr. Maw on the phone?

13

I feel like maybe she needs to be heard here because I think she

14

would take a very different path from that.

15

16
17

MR. PACK:

Ms. Maw could have submitted an affidavit.

She could have been here herself if it was that important.
THE COURT:

Well, let me read this and I'm not sure if

18

it matters to me whether she's an indirect victim or if she was

19

the direct victim. I think the real issue is whether proper

20

findings were made. Let me just look at these two cases a little

21

more closely.

22

[Long pause. ]

23

THE COURT:

Well, I find this frustrating because the

24

statute just wasn't followed and it seems like we have a wide-

25

spread practice of not following the statute. You know, we•re
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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1

routinely in statements of defendants not specifying complete and

2

court-ordered restitution or making findings to support it and

3

this case, Laycock, seems to say that you have to do that and it

4

didn't happen in this case and, so, it•s messy to retroactively,

5

five years later, go back and decide what to do.
So the statute wasn't followed precisely at the time,

6

7

No one disagreed to that. No one objected to that until five

8

years later. So defendant was participating and didn't say, hey.

9

I

10

11

need some findings or

I

object to this number or I object to

the way that this is happening.
So it leaves a question now of what to do with this and

12

it does seem that the entry onto the civil docket is really just

13

something that's supposed to happen. It's not a decision the

14

Judge needs to make. It's something that's supposed to happen

15

after you have a restitution order and the statute is a little·

16

ambiguous when it says once the judge decides that restitution is

17

owed the clerk is supposed to enter a civil judgment of complete

18

restitution. If anything, complete restitution would be more than

19

this number. It wouldn't inure to the detriment of the defendant.

20

It•s--the restitution that was clearly court-ordered is

21

the bottom amount that complete restitution could be. It

22

certainly has to be supported by the facts of what was owed and

23

complete restitution, if anything, would only be more. Court-

24

ordered restitution, if anything, would be less determining the

25

defendant's circumstances which wasn't done. So all it can be is
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1

complete restitution based on the information that was before the

2

Court.

3

I don•t think there is a clean answer here. I think

4

it's deficient, but that it wasn't objected to. So I really don't

5

think there is a clean answer. I don't find anything that

6

satisfactory in either direction. Because it seems enforceable,·

7

both sides agreed to it. It seems unfair to dispute it now, but

8

you know various things went wrong.

9

So I really am not--I'm not certain of the right thing

10

to do because to correct it, as a clerical error, would be to say

11

the Clerk should have done this because it's clear there should

12

have been a complete restitution ordered, but nothing was called

13

complete restitution and the statute and the Supreme Court has

14

clearly said we're supposed to call things complete and court-

15

ordered and that didn't happen. So it makes it difficult to say

16

it was just a clerical error.

17

If anyone has any brilliant proposals here, I'm happy

18

to hear it, but it just seems like there are problems with it

19

that make a clear answer difficult. The best proposal seems to be

20

what Mr. Nielsen is agreeing to be held to. It does prevent the

21

victim from going after assets unless he defaults, but I just

22

have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an

23

abuse of discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution

24

and court-ordered restitution, I have a hard time saying it was

25

just a clerical error for the Clerk to not record complete
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
801-286-9495 / thackertranscrlpts@gmall.com

Hearing - May 9, 2016
37

1

restitution as a judgment and nothing was called that.

2

Do you have any response to that? I mean the problem is

3

it's a common practice and it would make many, many restitution

4

orders insufficient.

5

MR. BATES:

Judge, I don't think it•s an abuse of

6

discretion where nobody is disputing the number and again I'll

7

just point out that Laycock and Barrett were contested

8

restitution cases. There's not a case that anyone can point to

9

where everybody agreed on restitution, but the Court of Appeals

10

or the Supreme Court faulted the trial court for not making

11

findings and not, you know, holding a hearing or making--going

12

through all the factors again and under subsection (4) of 301, I

13

think that clearly puts the onus on the defendant. When that

14

doesn't happen and he doesn't object, everything is kind of

15

washed.

16

So that seems to me to be the solution here is that

17

everybody kind of agreed to this and I take just one issue with

18

the Court's styling of the Clerk's obligation. Under 404(1) there

19

doesn't have to be restitution ordered. It simply says that upon

20

the Judge determining restitution. So once he determines this is

21

restitution, the Clerk is responsible to go enter the order.

22

MR. PACK:

23

TU COURT:

If I could respond.
So one question for Mr. Bates first. So

24

what happens in the general case where you don't have a specific

25

complete and court-ordered restitution identified? Once there's
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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1

restitution and it's just one number, does the Clerk just assume

2

that's the complete restitution number and enter that?

3

MR. BATES:

There's no other number. There's no reason,

4

I mean there's nothing in 301 prohibiting the Court from just

5

saying this is the number, you know, and calling that court-

6

ordered and complete restitution. It talks about making those

7

deteminations separately, but at the end of the day there's

8

nothing says it has to enter two separate numbers and if the

9

Court says this is the number, then I think the way the statute

10

is, that's the number for all intents and purposes and the Clerk,

11

in fact, if you look at 401. Again, 401(1) gives us the Clerk's

12

obligation.
When it talks about the Judge's determination and the

13

14

first part of that phrase, it doesn't distinguish between court-

15

ordered or complete restitution. It doesn't say when the Judge

16

detemines complete restitution. It just says when the Judge

17

determines restitution the Clerk shall go enter an order of

18

complete restitution in the civil judgment docket which seems to

19

suggest that if the Court only gives you one number, that's the

20

number.

21

'l'BE

COURT:

That's what you enter. Okay. All right.

22

We're going to take one quick break. I will hear you when I get

23

back.

24

MR. PACK:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
We'll be in recess.
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[RECBSS.]

2

MR. PACK:

So I think the Court--I think the Court gave

3

a hypothetical; that this was maybe occurring quite a bit and you

4

wanted to know what to do in a situation where there is an order

5

of restitution entered, but there's no distinction between

6

whether it's complete restitution or court-ordered restitution.
In a situation like that, I think the Court and the

7
8

parties can presume that it's complete restitution when that

9

civil judgment is recorded. It's presumed and that would have

10

been the same way in our case, but--sorry. One second. Let me get

11

'ttrf

12

notes here.
You know, we have a situation where there were on

13

findings. There was no statement between--that was in the order

14

of restitution that differentiated between complete restitution

15

and court-ordered restitution and no civil judgment was entered.

16

So I think the presumption is that it wasn't complete restitution

17

and I think it's the filing of that civil judgment which triggers

18

the defendant's obligation to object to that.

19

I mean, in our case we have no civil judgment entered.

20

So we had no duty to object. So it's not like we waited five

21

years to object to this judgment. We objected immediately. We

22

weren't even put on notice to object to the civil judgment.

23
24

25

THE

COURT:

Well, to the civil judgment, but was there

ever an objection to the restitution amount?
MR. PACK:

We presume that this was court-ordered
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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1

restitution. We have been put on notice that this is court-

2

ordered restitution because no civil judgment was entered. The

3

Nielsens, specifically Verna Nielsen, has been making upgrades to

4

her property starting this business under the assumption that

5

there was no final judgment which could come and take her

6

property away. Five years later, now that's changing and the

7

burden to object did not arise or notice to object did not arise

8

at the time of sentencing. It arose five years later and we're

9

timely objecting now.

10

THE COURT:

I don•t think there is any notice that a

11

civil judgment will be entered. It appears to just be automatic

12

upon a finding of restitution. The Clerk does it. Once the Judge

13

determines that restitution is owed, the Clerk just goes in,

14

enters the judgment. There's no notice. There's nothing to object

15

to. It just happens. It just happened to not take place here.
MR. PACK:

16

Right, but I mean if the Court is trying to

17

figure out whether it's court-ordered or complete restitution, we

18

have no findings of fact to know and I think there's every reason

19

to believe the actual complete restitution amount could have been

20

higher. We just don't know. There was just nothing to object to

21

at that time. There was no document that says final civil

22

judgment.

23

If the Court has any other questions.

24

THE COURT:

25

No, that's all. Anything left that you'd

like to say, Mr. Bates?
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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MR. BATES:

1

Just that I understand Mr. Pack was not

2

counsel of record at the time this happened. It strikes me as odd

3

that the defendant would go forward under that assumption; that

4

the Court has violated its obligation and used its discretion in

5

not making a complete restitution finding and not having the

6

Clerk enter that same judgment. That was his thinking going

7

forward, that there was some sort of detrimental reliance upon

8

the Court not fulfilling its statutory obligation. I guess I'm

9

doubtful that actually would occur.

10

MR. PACK:

And my last point. I know this is a tough

11

issue and I think our proposal is the best issue. I think it

12

avoids it picking up a lot of dust, I think, if one party or the

13

other is going to definitely appeal this because this is an

14

unsettled question and let the Court of Appeals decide this, but

15

I think our proposal can avoid that and can be a win/win for

16

everyone.

17
18
19

20

TBB COURT:

And have the parties discussed that?

Because there's a risk of that. There is a risk.
MR. BATES:

I've had that discussion with the victim,

Your Honor.

21

TBE COURT:

Okay.

22

[Long pause.]

23

THE COURT:

Okay. All right. Well, I wish there were a

24

cleaner record on this. I will just make the findings that I can

25

from the information that I have and then rule the best that I
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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can based on the record in this case.
So there is not an explicit finding in the judgment in

2

3

this case as to whether restitution--the restitution number was

4

complete, court-ordered or both. However, at the time and since

5

then there was not a dispute as to the restitution amount and it

6

was agreed upon by the parties at the time of sentencing and it

7

hasn't been disputed • .Amount has not ever been disputed. So this

8

was an agreed upon amount.

77-38A-401 says upon the Court determining that a

9

10

defendant owes restitution, the Clerk of the Court shall enter an

11

order of complete restitution on the civil judgment docket. This

12

didn't happen. I do think it's important that that statute says

13

upon the Court determining that a defendant owes restitution. It

14

doesn't specifically say that upon the Court labeling a

15

restitution amount as complete, that then the Clerk must go ahead

16

and enter that. It says as soon as the Court determines that

17

defendant owes restitution, the Clerk shall order that as a civil

18

judgment.

19

a

I will note here this before me today is not a dispute

20

about a restitution a mount. It's a dispute as to whether it is

21

appropriate to enter a civil judgment at this time and looking at

22

the statute, it's clear that this is supposed to be an automatic

23

function. This is something that the Clerk is supposed to

24

automatically do as soon as the Court determines that restitution

25

is owed. It's not something that there's any particular notice.
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It's just something that happens after sentencing and for

2

whatever reason this didn't happen.

3

In looking at Rule 30{b), it states that you can

4

correct a clerical mistake and when looking at what the factors

5

are to determine if something is clerical, one is whether the

6

order or judgment rendered reflects what was done or intended. I

7

think that the restitution amount was clearly the one that was

8

agreed upon by the parties and that the Court intended to order

9

and that's what should have been. Barring some different, lesser

10

order, lesser amount that was ordered as court-ordered

11

restitution, that's what should have been placed on the civil

12

judgment docket.

13

Second, whether the error was the result of judicial

14

reasoning or decision-making. I don't think this is. The Court

15

should have called it complete and court-ordered, but the fact

16

that everyone agreed to this number, I don't think there's a

17

dispute about what the Court meant to do. This wasn't a Court

18

decision to not enter it as a civil judgment. It should have

19

happened and then, finally, whether the error is clear from the

20

record. I think it's clear that this restitution amount was

21

entered and it was not entered as a civil judgment.

22
23
24

25

So under Rule 30(b), I'll say that this can be entered
in the docket as a civil judgment.
Mr. Bates, since you have agreed to adopt the number

that is without interest, what is that number and are both sides
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DAVID R. BRJCKEY, #6188
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Justice Center
6300 North Silver Creek Drive
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
in and for SUMMIT COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENTANDCOMMITMENT
PLAINTIFF

vs.
Criminal No. 091500159
GARY WILLIAM NIELSEN,

D.O.B. 02-24-44
DEFENDANT.

Judge

On the 26th day of July, 2010, David R. Brickey, Summit County Attorney, attorney for the
State of Utah, and the defendant, by and through counsel, Gail E. Laser, appeared before the above
court for sentencing.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon plea of guilty to the offense
ofTheft, a Second Degree Felony. The Court having asked ifthe defendant had anything to say why
judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or
appearing to the court,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

00005~
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IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for a period of
one (1) to fifteen (15) years as provided by law for the offense of which the defendant is adjudged
guilty.

IT IS ORDERED that the execution ofthe foregoing sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation with the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for a period
of six (6) years under the following tenns and conditions, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-181, et. seq.
1.

That the defendant maintain good behavior and have no violations of any laws;

2.

That the defendant comply with all terms and conditions imposed by Adult Probation
and Parole;

3.

That the defendant serve one (1) year in the Summit County Jail with commitment
to issue forthwith;

4.

That the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $346,248.58 to Creekside
Funding, c/o Rick Arnold, S255 West 11000 North, Suite 100, Highland, Utah,
84003;

S.

That the defendant not practice law in the State of Utah without the approval of the
Utah State Bar.
,'I,

DATED this c:U'ctay of July, 2010.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this
__ day of July, 2010, to the following:
Gail E. Laser
P.O. Box 566
Park City, Utah 84060-566
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DAVID R. BRICKEY, #6188
Summit County Attorney
PAUL R. CHRlSTENSEN, #5677
Prosecuting Attorney
Summit County Justice Center
6300 North Silver Creek Drive
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone (435) 615-3828
Facsimile (435) 615-3833
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
in and for SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER MODIFYING TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
PLAINTIFF

VS.

Criminal No. 091500 I 59

GARY WILLIAM NIELSEN,
D.O.B. 02-24-44
Judge
DEFENDANT.
Having heretofore adjudged the defendant guilty ofthe offense ofTheft, a Second Degree Felony,

the Court on the 26th day of July, 2010, imposed sentence on said defendant that the defendant be placed
on probation with the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for a period of six years
under various tenns and conditions.
On the 8th day of November, 2010, the defendant appeared in person and with counsel, Joseph
Wrona, for a review hearing. The State of Utah was represented by Paul R. Christensen, Summit County

@

Prosecuting Attomey. Upon review of the matter, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant's previous sentence be modified
as foJJows:
@
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1.

That the defendant complete all terms and conditions previously imposed on July 26, 20 IO;

2.

That the defendant be released from the Summit County Jail on November 8, 20 IO;

3.

That the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $346,248.58 to Creekside Funding, c/o
Rick Arnold, S2SS W-QO North, Suite I 00, Highland, Utah, 84003. Defendant shall
pay 25% of his Jdi g
oss income as restitution up to an income of $120,000. If
defendant's income is more than $120,000, restitution shall be reassessed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court reserves the right to make further orders in
connection with this matter.
DATED this~~ay of November, 2010.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Modifying Terms and
~tions of Probation in the matter of State of Utah v. Gary William Nielsen, postage prepaid, this
.n:_ day of November, 2010, to the following:
Joseph E. Wrona
WRONA LAW FIRM, PC
174S Sidewinder Drive
Park City, Utah 84060
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§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment--lnterest--Civil actions--Lien, UT ST § 77-38a-401

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 4. Restitution Judgments
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-401
§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment--Interest--Civil actions--Lien

Currentness
(I) Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of complete
restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the parties.

(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment, enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition,
the department may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution order
as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue
collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover collection and reasonable attorney fees.

(4) Notwithstanding Subsection 77-18-6(l)(b)(v) and Sections 78B-2-311 and 78B-5-202, a judgment ordering restitution
when entered on the civil judgment docket shall have the same affect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment in a
civil action and expires only upon payment in full, which includes applicable interest, collection fees, and attorney fees.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing, including prejudgment interest. This Subsection
(4) applies to all restitution judgments not paid in full on or before May 12, 2009.

(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder
of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Credits
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 9, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2208, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 111, § 1, eff. May
12, 2009; Laws 2011, c. 37, § 1, eff. May 10, 2011.

Notes of Decisions (6)
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-401, UT ST§ 77-38a-401
Current through 2016 Second Special Session
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